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CASES NOTED
in so far as a college education is concerned? 13 Perhaps through the use
of Pass v. Pass14 and the other cases of the majority view it represents,' 5
the courts will find themselves free to order a financially-able father to
provide a college education to his minor child deserving of such an
education when the parents are "happily" married.
MARVIN H. GILLMAN
REFUSAL TO TESTIFY ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS
- DISCHARGE FROM STATE EMPLOYMENT
Petitioner, a temporary county social worker,' refused to testify about
his political beliefs and associations before a sub-committee of the House
Un-American Activities Committee. His refusal to answer was based on
the first and fifth amendments of the United States Constitution. Pursuant
to the provisions of a California statute, 2 which required state employees
to testify before any investigating body when so ordered, and which
made any state employee who refused to do so guilty of insubordination,
petitioner was summarily discharged.3 The California Court of Appeals
upheld the dismissal. 4 By certiorari, petitioner challenged the constitu-
tionality of the statute, claiming it to be in violation of the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution; contending his discharge
from state employment for the exercise of a federal right was a denial of
due process of law. Held, affirmed (5-3),5 the statute is a reasonable
exercise of the power of the state to regulate and supervise the conduct
of its employees. Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 143 (1960).
Prior to the last decade, the question of the power of the states to
discharge employees who refused to testify before investigating committees
and bodies had not been before the United States Supreme Court,
although numerous state cases had dealt with the problem. The state
courts, with a few notable exceptions,6 have upheld such dismissals. Most
13. See text accompanying note 5 supra.
14. 118 So.2d 769 (Miss. 1960).
15. See note 6 supra.
1. The opinion of the Court deals with petitioner Globe, a temporary county
employee, only. The decision of the state court as to petitioner Nelson, a permanent
employee, was affirmed without opinion by an equally divided court. Mr. Chief Justice
Warren did not participate.
2. Cal. Gov't Code § 1028.1 (1953).
3. Los Angeles County Civil Service Rules § 19.07. (temporary employees are
subject to summary dismissal at any time during their probationary periods.)
4. Globe v. County of Los Angeles, 163 Cal. App.2d 595, 329 P.2d 971 (1958).
5. Mr. Justice Clark wrote for the Court. Mr. Justices Black, Brennan and
Douglas dissented. Mr. Chief Justice Warren did not participate.
6. Board of Educ. v. Mass, 148 Cal. App.2d 392, 304 P.2d 1015 (1956)
(summary dismissal of state employee, who refused to testify reversed); Opinion of the
Justices, 332 Mass. 763, 126 N.E.2d 100 (1958) (advisory opinion holding unconstitu-
tional a proposed statute to discharge employees who refuse to testifv.)
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of the state courts have not analyzed the question, but have relied upon
an epigram of Justice Holmes, "Petitioner may have a constitutional right
to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." 7
When the state courts have attempted to analyze the question, they have
upheld such discharges on the ground that when duty and privilege conflict,
the privilege must be abandoned. 8 This reasoning has been applied to
uphold the dismissal of police officers,9 teachers,'0 firemen' and other
public employees 12 for the exercise of federal privileges, including refusals
to testify, deemed inconsistent with the duty of public employment. One
exception to this general rule is the refusal of the state courts to allow
the disbarment of attorneys who refuse to testify before investigating
bodies, despite the holding that attorneys, as officers of the court, are
quasi-public officers.' 3
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that there is one
limitation upon the power of the states to discharge employees who refuse
to testify, either on first or fifth amendment grounds, before investigating
bodies. 14 In Slochower v. Board of Higher Education," the Court held
that no inference of guilt could be drawn from the exercise of these
constitutional privileges before a federal committee. The New York Court
of Appeals had held that Professor Slochower's refusal to testify was the
equivalent of his "resignation" and upheld his summary discharge from
state employment.' 6 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding
that his refusal to testify was converted into a conclusive presumption of
7. McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
8. Christal v. Police Comm'n of San Francisco, 33 Cal. App.2d 564, 569,
92 P.2d 416, 419 (1939), "There is nothing startling in the conception that a public
servant's right to retain his office or employment should depend upon his willingness
to forego his constitutional rights and privileges to the extent that the exercise of such
rights and privileges may be inconsistent with the performance of the duties of his
office or employment."
9. Fraze v. Civil Service Bd., 170 Cal. App.2d 333, 338 P.2d 943 (1959);
Christal v. Police Comm'n of San Francisco, 33 Cal. App.2d 564, 92 P.2d 416 (1939);
Drury v. Hurley, 339 I11. App. 33, 88 N.E.2d 728 (1949); Canteline v. McClellan,
282 N.Y. 166, 25 N.E.2d 972 (1940); Souder v. City of Philadelphia, 305 Pa. 1,
56 At]. 245 (1931); Brownell v. Russell, 76 Vt. 306, 57 AtI. 103 (1904).
10. Pockman v. Leonard, 39 Cal.2d 676, 249 P.2d 267 (1952); Joyce v. Board
of Educ.. 325 I11. App. 543, 60 N.E.2d 431 (1945); Faron v. School Comm. of
Boston, 331 Mass. 531, 120 N.E.2d 772 (1954); Coldway v. Board of Higher Educ.,
178 Misc. 1023, 37 N.Y.S.2d 34 (App. Div. 1942).
11. Bell v. District Court of Holyoke, 314 Mass. 622, 51 N.E.2d 328 (1943);
People ex rel. Clifford v. Scannel, 74 App. Div. 406, 77 N.Y. Supp. 704"(Sup. Ct. 1902).
12. Hirschman v. Los Angeles County, 39 Cal.2d 698, 249 P.2d 287 (1952),
cert. denied sub nor. Petherbridge v. Los Angeles County, 345 U.S. 1002 (1953);
Koral v. Board of Educ., 197 Misc. 221, 94 N.Y.S.2d 378 (App. Div. 1950);
Fitzgerald v. Philadelphia, 376 Pa. 379, 102 A.2d 887 (1954).
13. Sheiner v. State, 82 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1955); In re Holland, 377 Ill. 346,
36 N.E.2d 543 (1941); Matter of Grae, 282 N.Y. 428, 26 N.E.2d 963 (1940).
14. See generally PRITCHETT, THE POLITICAL OFFENDER AND THE WARREN COURT
48-54 (1958).
15. 350 U.S. 551 (1956). Mr. Justice Clark wrote for the Court, Mr. justices
Burton, Reed, Minton and Harlan dissented.
16. Daniman v. Board of Educ., 306 N.Y. 532, 538, 119 N.E.2d 373, 377 (1954),
"The assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination is equivalent to a resignation."
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guilt and that due process was violated by such an inference being drawn
from the exercise of the constitutional privilege before a federal committee.' 7
The Court held that before Slochower could be discharged by the state
he must be given an opportunity to explain his refusal to testify before
a state body.18 In reaching this result the court carefully distinguished
Garner v. Board of Public Works,19 which upheld the power of the states
to require a loyalty oath and affidavit as a condition of public employment.
In distinguishing Slochower from Garner, the Court said that the states
would be free to draw the necessary conclusions when employees refuse
to testify before state committees examining their qualifications for office.20
It was apparent that the Supreme Court had created a distinction between
inferences that could be drawn from a refusal to testify before a state
and a federal investigating body for purposes of discharge from state
employment.
The lower federal courts have applied the "no inference" rule of
Slochower to prohibit the federal government from withholding retirement
pay to former employees who refused to testify before federal committees, 21
but have not applied the rule to alien deportation hearings. 22
The "no inference" rule of the Slochower case was followed by the
Supreme Court in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California2 3 in which it held
that a refusal to answer questions relating to political activities before
the state bar examiners could not support an inference of "bad moral
17. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557-559 (1956), "The
privilege against self-incrimination would be reduced to a hollow mockery if the exercise
could be taken either as equivalent to a confession of guilt or a conclusive presumption
of perjury .... In practical effect the questions asked are taken as confessed and made
the basis of the discharge....
[T]he board seized upon his claim of privilege before the federal committee and
converted it . .. into a conclusive presumption of guilt. Since no inference of guilt
was possible from the claim before the federal committee, the discharge falls of its
own weight."
18. Id. at 558. "No consideration is given to such factors as the subject matter
of the questions, remoteness of the period to which they are directed, or justification for
exercise of the privilege. . . .The heavy hand of the statute falls alike on all who
exercise their constitutional privilege, the full enjoyment of which every person is
entitled to receive."
19. 341 U.S. 716 (1951) (upheld the power of the states to require a loyalty oath
and affidavit as a condition of employment and to discharge employees who refuse to
do so, even though such refusal was based on fifth amendment grounds).
20. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 558 (1956), "It is one
thing for the city authorities themselves to inquire into Slochower's fitness, but quite
another for his discharge to be based entirely on events occurring before a federal
committee whose inquiry was announced as not directed at the property, affairs or
government of the city, or ...official conduct of city employees. In this respect the
present case differs materially from Garner."
21. Steinberg v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 590 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
22. Da Costa v. Holland, 151 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Pa. 1958); Vlisidis v. Holland,
150 F. Supp. 678 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 245 F.2d 812 (3d Cir. 1957).
23. 353 U.S. 252 (1957). Mr. Justice Black wrote for the court, Mr. Justices Harlan
and Clark dissented on the merits, Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented on jurisdictional
grounds.
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character" as grounds for denying admission to the bar.24 The inference
held invalid in the Konigsberg case was drawn from a refusal to answer
before a state committee, and it ap peared the Court was extending the
doctrine of the Slochower case to include state investigations. 25 The dis-
senting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan argued that a state should be free
to draw whatever inferences it desires when a state body is frustrated
by a refusal of a witness to answer relevant questions.26
This apparent extension of the Slochower rule was soon to prove
illusory, for the Court in later cases was to return to the federal-state
distinction formulated in Slochower to uphold the dismissal of state
employees. In Beilan v. Board of Education27 and Lerner v. Casey,28 the
Court upheld the discharge of state employees who refused to testify before
state investigating bodies on the grounds that the refusal was before a
state, not a federal body. In Beilan a teacher was discharged for "incom-
petence," although his only dereliction from duty was refusing to testify
before a state body. The court held that no inference of guilt was drawn
from his refusal to answer; his refusal to testify was equated with
"statutory incompetence." To justify the result the Court reasoned that
Beilan was under a duty to cooperate; his lack of candor and frankness
in refusing to testify constituted "incompetence," not his plea of consti-
tutional privilege. The Court distinguished Konigsberg on the grounds
that no inferences were drawn from Beilan's refusal to testify. 29 Slochower
was considered inapplicable due to the state-federal investigation distinc-
tion.3 0 In Lerner v. Casey3l which had an analogous factual pattern,
similar reasoning was employed by the Court to uphold a dismissal on
grounds of "doubtful trust and reliability," although the sole basis for
such a determination was the employee's refusal to testify before a state
body. The Court also held in Lerner that a plea of the fifth amendment
is not valid before a state body, thus Lerner's refusal to answer was
24. Id. at 270, "Obviously the State could not draw unfavorable inferences as to
his truthfulness, candor or moral character in general if his refusal to answer was based
on the belief that the United States Constitution prohibited the type of inquiry which
the committee was making. . . . [Ilt is our judgment that the inference of bad moral
character which the committee attempted to draw from Konigsberg's refusal to answer
questions about his political affiliations and opinions are unwarranted."
25. The Konigsberg case can be distinguished factually from Slochower and Nelson.
However Konigsberg does hold that a state may not draw unfavorable inferences from
a refusal to testify before a state committee.
26. 353 U.S. 252, 276 (1957) (dissent).
27. 357 U.S. 399 (1958). Mr. Justice Burton wrote for the Court, Mr. Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Black, Brennan and Douglas dissented. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
concurred.
28. 357 U.S. 468 (1958). Mr. Justice Harlan wrote for the Court, Mr. Chief
Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan dissented. Mr. Justice
Frankfurter concurred.
29. Beilan v. Board of Educ., supra note 27 at 409.
30. Id. at 409 (quoting from Slochower, see note 20 supra).
31. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
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without legal basis and he was subject to discharge.32 The state-federal
distinction was also reaffirmed in Lerner.33
In the instant case34 petitioner Globe did not contest his discharge
on the grounds that he was denied a hearing before the local officials;35
he argued that his discharge for "insubordination," based on his refusal
to testify before a federal committee on constitutional grounds, constituted
arbitrary and unreasonable state action. In upholding his dismissal, the
Court held the federal-state investigation distinction of the Slochower case
distinguishable on three grounds: (1) no inference of guilt was drawn
by the state from the exercise of the constitutional privilege,3 6 (2) Globe,
unlike Slochower had been ordered by his superior to appear and testify,37
(3) the California statute required state employees to testify before all
investigating committees, state and federal.3 8 In upholding the discharge,
the Court reasoned that if Globe had not appeared before the committee
at all his discharge would be valid; as the state drew no inference of guilt
from his claim of constitutional privilege that claim could not be used
to frustrate the power of the state over its employees.39
Mr. Justice Black, in dissent, 40 stated that the only basis for Globe's
discharge was his refusal to testify before a federal committee under a
claim of constitutional privilege. He argued that to allow a state to discharge
an employee on such grounds is a violation of Article VI (Supremacy
Clause) of the Constitution, as well as a violation of Fourteenth Amendment
due process. 41
Mr. Justice Brennan, also dissenting,42 argued that Nelson should be
controlled by Slochower; the two cases being indistinguishable and that the
32. Id. at 478 (citing Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958), decided
the same day as Lemer).
33. Id. at 477, "[l]n Slochower such a claim had been asserted in a federal
inquiry having nothing to do with the qualification of persons for state employment,
and the Court, in its opinion carefully distinguished that situation from one, where,
as here, a State is conducting an inquiry into fitness of its employees."
34. Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 143 (1960).
35. Temporary employees are subject to summary discharge under Los Angeles
County Civil Service Rules. See note 3 supra.
36. Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 143, 80 Sup. Ct. 527, 531 (1960),
"The test here, rather than being the invocation of any constitutional privilege, is the
failure of the employee to answer. California has not predicated discharge on any
"built in" inference of guilt in its statute, but solely on employee insubordination for
failure to give information. . . .The fact that he chose to place his refusal on a Fifth
Amendment claim put the matter in no different posture for ...California did not
employ that claim as the basis for drawing an inference of guilt."
37. Id. at 531, "[I]t must be remembered that here- unlike Slochower- the
Board had specifically ordered the employees to appear and answer."
38. Cal. Gov't Code § 1028.1 (1953).
39. Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 143, 80 Sup. Ct. 527, 531 (1960).
40. Id. at 532 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black).
41. Id. at 532, "The Federal Constitution told Globe he could, without penalty,
refuse to incriminate himself before any arm of the Federal Government; California
however has deprived him of his job solely because he exercised this federal constitutional
privilege. In giving supremacy to the California law, I think the Court approves a plain
violation of Article VI of the Constitution of the United States which makes the
Constitution "the supreme Law of the Land .. . any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
42. Id. at 532 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan).
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constitutional infirmities that existed in the Slochower case were present
in Nelson. Mr. Justice Brennan stated that the distinction made by the
Court, that Globe was discharged for "insubordination" and Slochower
discharged because of an inference of guilt arising from his refusal to
answer was without merit. He contended that the New York court in
Slochower had treated the refusal to testify as a "resignation" in the same
manner as the California court had treated the refusal to testify as
"insubordination," and that the Supreme Court in Slochower had recog-
nized that "only in practical effect that the questions asked were taken as
confessed."43 Mr. Justice Brennan stated that the same arbitrary unfitness
for office was drawn by the California court in Nelson as by the New
York court in Slochower.44
The majority of the court, in upholding Globe's dismissal, held that
Beilan and Lerner controlled, and that the state could equate a refusal
to testify before a federal committee with insubordination, in the same
manner that it could equate a refusal to testify before a state committee
with "incompetence" 46 or "doubtful trust and reliability." 46 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court disregarded the dictum of the Lerner and Beilan
cases which allowed such conclusions since the Court presumed that the
state investigation was for the purpose of inquiring into the fitness of
the state employee to hold his office. No such purpose has ever been
the reason for the investigation of the House Un-American Activities
Committee.47 Thus, the result in the instant case hinged upon the validity
of the previously formulated federal-state investigation distinction, and
here considered inapplicable. In rejecting this distinction, originally drawn
in Slochower and restated in Beilan and Lerner, the Court stated that
since the California statute required its employees to testify before all
investigating bodies the distinction was not applicable. It is submitted
that this reasoning is questionable. The New York court in Slochower,
by affirming Slochower's dismissal, had held the New York statute applicable
to federal as well as state investigation. The fact that the California
statute by its wording required such testimony, while the New York
statute by its interpretation so required should not be considered determina-
tive for due process considerations.
It is difficult to imagine two cases more factually identical than
Nelson and Slochower. If the court did not intend to reverse the Slochower
decision, then it has been limited to the extent of being impliedly
overruled. If, as the Supreme Court has said, "Constitutional protection
does extend to the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute
43. Id. at 534.
44. Ibid.
45. Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958).
46. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958).
47. Nelson v . County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 143, 80 Sup. Ct. 527, 534
(dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brennan).
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is patently arbitrary or discriminatory"48 and "to state that a person does
not have a constitutional right to government employment is only to say
that he must comply with reasonable, lawful and non-discriminatory terms
laid down by the proper authorities,"49 then the dismissal of Globe should
have been reversed as a denial of due process of law upon the authority of
Slochower.
RIcRARD E. RECKSON
48. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952).
49. Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 555 (1956).
1960]
